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Introduction  
Colombia’s approach to intelligence over the past two decades has focused on improving public 
security by combating the real and active threat posed by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC), the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), the National Liberation 
Army (ELN), drug traffickers and the illicit activities in which they participate. In Colombia’s more 
recent past, the security sector has made significant strides in achieving success against the 
aforementioned illegal armed groups.  
This paper will briefly look at the Colombian security environment, discuss how the security and 
intelligence apparatus has changed over the last decade and a half to accomplish their mission, 
and look at the mechanisms for providing control of the intelligence services.  
In so doing I will highlight some existing tensions in Colombia at achieving transparency of their 
intelligence services and increasing those services’ effectiveness. 
Strategic Environment  
Colombia’s armed conflict has involved Colombian government forces, insurgents of the FARC 
and the smaller ELN, the groups constituting the AUC, and powerful drug lords. The highly 
lucrative drug trade from which all the armed groups profit and attempt to control in the regions in 
which they operate has exacerbated this conflict. These illegal groups have used Colombia’s 
porous borders to support their illicit transactions, as arms supply routes, and to provide safe 
haven from Colombian security forces, whose primary focus remains in combating these illegal 
groups and the drug trade in order to provide public security. The ongoing fight has lasted for 
decades and has ebbed and flowed within what many identify as a culture of violence particular to 
Colombia.  
The ability of drug cartels to challenge the central government increased significantly in the 
1980’s and 1990’s as revenue from the drug trade, kidnapping and extortion enabled them to 
expand their capabilities and to act with impunity. Indeed, during the heyday of the Medellín and 
Cali Cartels in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the likes of Pablo Escobar and the Ochoa brothers 
in Medellín and the Rodriguez Orejuela brothers in Cali seemed to have more control over parts 
of Colombia than did the government.[1]  
As the Colombian security services focused on and began to succeed against the drug cartels in 
the early to mid 1990s, the FARC was able to improve its strength, gaining control of significant 
amounts of territory in the mid-to-late 1990s due to increased revenues from the drug trade, 
increasing tactical capabilities against the Colombian armed forces and the establishment of the 
Despeje a 42,000 square kilometer territory “cleared” of government forces granted to the FARC 
from November 1998 to February 2002 by former President Andrés Pastrana as part of an 
attempted peace process.[2] At the height of the FARC’s strength, they were said to exercise 
some degree of control over 40% of the country.  
It should be noted that the AUC and the central government agreed in December 2002 to a 
cease-fire and demobilization. The demobilization process was legalized after a lengthy and 
contentious debate and embodied in Colombia’s Justice and Peace Law (law 975 of 2005). The 
law’s implementation, however, did not end the controversy as many citizens and observers 
claimed it was nothing more than a handout to the AUC and demanded more accountability. 
Colombia’s supreme court rectified many of the most problematic issues, in May 2006, rendering 
portions of the law unconstitutional.[3] Despite the ongoing issues that will not likely be resolved 
in the near term, more than 30,000 members of the AUC had been ‘demobilized’ as of last 
August.[4] However, a recent Organization of American States (OAS) mission has observed 
some ongoing problems with the demobilization process: Some units of the AUC have not been 
dismantled, the re-emergence of some groups in regions previously controlled by the AUC, being 
led by mid-ranking AUC members (some demobilized, some not) and recruiting former AUC 
combatants. According to the OAS, “These groups are expanding and taking control of illegal 
economic activities.[5] In addition, there have been documented reprisal killings. 
Colombian Intelligence Services[6]  
Colombia has a total of seven intelligence organizations providing analysis to governmental and 
military agencies.  
The DAS is designated as the primary intelligence service in Colombia. It is responsible for 
producing strategic intelligence and counterintelligence; investigating crimes that threaten state 
security such as terrorism, kidnapping, drug and human trafficking; and all issues concerning 
immigration. It coordinates and executes personal security of the president, his ministers, and 
persons at risk and is Colombia’s link to INTERPOL.[7] DAS employs about 7000 personnel of 
which little more than 800 work specifically on intelligence or counterintelligence issues.[8] A 
civilian, Andrés Peñate, who reports to the executive branch’s administrative department, heads 
DAS. Its annual budget is about $100 million, thought not all of that is focused on intelligence 
matters.  
The military services, Air Force, Army, and Navy each have their own intelligence organizations 
which specialize in their area of expertise. The Army is focused on the military structures and 
operations of the illegal groups in Colombia. The Air Force specializes in interdicting aircraft 
operating illegally in Colombian territory, while the Navy concentrates on controlling waterways 
that illegal armed groups use to support operations and traffic drugs. All three services run human 
intelligence programs.  
The military also has a joint intelligence organization, (the Centro de Inteligencia Conjunto or the 
D-2), which is responsible for coordinating all military intelligence and a joint intelligence center at 
Tres Esquinas Military Base, which is primarily focused on drug-related intelligence.  
The National Police, which fall under control of the Defense Ministry, also have an intelligence 
unit known as DIPOL (la Dirección de Inteligencia de la Policia Nacional). DIPOL works the 
intelligence problem primarily in urban areas, attempting to curtail organized crime, break up 
insurgent cells and stop kidnapping, drug trafficking and other illicit activities.  
The Treasury’s UIAF (The Unit of Information and Financial Analysis or UIAF) was created in 
1999 and was formed to combat money laundering. The UIAF has broad powers to investigate 
illegal activity related to drug trafficking, kidnapping, rebellion, extortion, and illicit enrichment. In 
addition to its investigatory practices, the UIAF analyzes illicit transactions and advises the 
Colombian Government on how to develop policies to deter and defeat illicit activity.  
Finally, the independent Attorney General’s Technical Corps of Investigations (CTI), is not an 
intelligence organization in the strictest sense; however, it does collect and analyze information in 
order to bring criminals to justice and does manage some HUMINT sources.[9] 
Democratic Civilian Control of Intelligence Services in Colombia  
Democratic control of intelligence is exerted through the processes of direction and oversight. 
Direction is the guidance that civilian authorities give to their nation’s intelligence community 
regarding its overall mission. Such guidance can be embodied in day-to-day orders and feedback 
as well as in a written national-security strategy. Oversight is a systematic process of reviewing 
an intelligence community’s actions, organization, budget, internal policies, and legal constraints 
with the goal of improving effectiveness as well as ensuring democratic civilian control. There are 
five key elements where control of an intelligence community occurs: executive, legislative, 
judicial, internal, and through various external means.[10] While some assert that democratic 
accountability only stems from bodies outside of the executive branch, this argument negates 
oversight mechanisms available to executive, such as the President’s oversight board in the 
United States, and within the intelligence community itself such as professional and ethical 
standards.  
The following paragraphs will document the changes in control over the intelligence community 
that have occurred in Colombia since 1990. I use this date because it is the starting point of the 
presidential term coinciding with the 1991 reformation of Colombia under a new constitution.[11] 
In each segment discussed here, improvements in democratic control have generally improved 
effectiveness and have led to increased transparency as well.  
Executive  
President Cesar Gaviria (1990-1994), amongst myriad other reforms under his tenure, embarked 
on a policy to become more involved in security matters. His focus was on the security threat 
posed by drug cartels and he ordered intelligence and security services to focus their efforts on 
the drug lords. He reactivated the Presidential Advisory Council for Defense and National 
Security, a group that had been largely idle for 20 years, and organized a special advisory 
committee for coordinating national intelligence.[12] Gaviria also tasked the Ministry of Defense, 
the Advisory Council, the DAS, and the National Directorate for criminal affairs to make policy 
recommendations on Colombia’s security strategy. Gaviria attempted to strengthen the 
intelligence capabilities of both the DAS and military/police intelligence by acquiring technical 
equipment and providing training in order to make the organizations more effective.  
Gaviria also instituted departmental security councils throughout the country in order to integrate 
intelligence at the local, regional, departmental and country-wide levels. Gaviria allowed the 
Ministry of Defense to continue its reorganization of military intelligence networks, which added a 
wide array of urban and rural intelligence networks, better integrated intelligence into military 
operations, and allocated additional resources for the military’s intelligence organizations.[13]  
The presidency of Ernesto Samper (1994-1998) was beset by corruption and poor relations with 
the United States. While Samper was able to dismantle the Cali Cartel under his watch, he and 
members of his government were alleged or proved to have had ties to funds from drug 
traffickers.[14] This led to the U.S. “decertification” of Colombia as an ally in fighting drugs in 1996 
and 1997, thus significantly reducing aid. The cutback in U.S. financial support, Samper’s 
mismanagement of the economy and poor national strategy were contributing factors to the 
Colombian Military’s ignoble defeats at the hands of the FARC from 1996 to 1998.[15]  
President Samper did reorganize Colombia’s intelligence community through Presidential Decree 
2233 of 1995, which created the National Intelligence System or SINAI. SINAI included 
representation from the Minister of Defense, Minister of Justice; the heads of the DAS, and 
DIPOL; and the directors of the military services including the Colombian Joint Staff (though in 
practice, the intelligence heads of the military organizations were the participants). Its purpose 
was to unify and coordinate intelligence policy at a national level, strengthen cooperation, 
increase efficiency, and create new systems for the planning, collection, analysis and 
dissemination of intelligence.[16] Unfortunately, SINAI rarely met because Samper did not 
emphasize its importance, and it never really became effective.  
When President Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002) took office, his focus was twofold: first, pursue 
peace with the FARC and, second, improve the security sector, which was in great need of repair 
by 1998. To achieve the first goal, Pastrana instituted the Despeje in November 1998. Later, 
Pastrana launched Plan Colombia as a way to simultaneously promote peace, combat narcotics, 
revive the economy and strengthen democracy in 2000.[17]  
Pastrana pursued military restructuring aggressively and included its intelligence services. Indeed, 
improvements in military intelligence were given the second highest priority in the military’s 
transformation plan.[18] Advances were made across the board to include collection, analysis, 
counterintelligence, training and military intelligence’s ability to integrate into operations.  
President Pastrana reorganized intelligence under Decree Law 218 of February 2000. The 
executive decree tasked the intelligence organization to “produce intelligence the state requires to 
make decisions and formulate policy related to the interior and exterior security of the country” 
and specified DAS functions and offices.[19]  
Despite the reforms in the military and intelligence sectors, most would argue that Pastrana 
pursued peace blindly and the reforms he made in the military and intelligence sector were not 
well integrated into his national strategy.  
The election of President Álvaro Uribe in 2002 and his reelection in 2006 significantly altered the 
security landscape in Colombia. Uribe was the benefactor of two important changes in Colombia. 
First, President Pastrana officially ended the Despeje in February 2002, depriving the FARC of its 
main sanctuary and disrupting critical logistics and troop mobility corridors. Second, the United 
States altered its policy that previously limited the use of U.S.-provided equipment to anti-drug 
operations, freeing it up for use in counterinsurgency operations.  
Uribe promulgated his Defense and Democratic and Security Policy in 2003. This policy was a 
detailed plan for consolidating state control of the country, improving security, fighting the drug 
business, and fostering good governance.[20] It remains in effect today and is arguably the most 
coherent security strategy in Colombian history.  
Building on his 2002 election victory and his national security policy, Uribe began to reassert state 
authority under a military campaign known as Plan Patriota, launched in mid-2003. Colombian 
government forces began by securing the region in and around Bogotá where the effort was 
largely successful.[21] By the end of 2004, the government was able to meet its goal of 
establishing a presence in each of the country’s 1098 municipalities while just three years prior 
nearly 200 lacked any central government presence. Other security indicators were very positive 
in the first half of 2006 compared to just three years prior: homicides down by 30%, massacres 
down by 57%, kidnapping down by 73%, overall terrorist attacks down by 33%.[22]  
President Uribe also made vital changes in the Colombian intelligence community. He 
established a Joint Intelligence Council (JIC) made up of all the state’s intelligence bodies 
“responsible for producing consolidated intelligence analysis to provide the President and the 
Minister of Defense the necessary information to make decisions; to translate the government’s 
security policies into intelligence requirements; and to coordinate the distribution of work, 
providing for specialization and avoiding duplication.”[23] The JIC meets twice a month, but lacks 
a permanent staff and, in practice, has limited authority.  
Uribe also placed his personal stamp on a legal framework for the DAS, signing executive decree 
643 of 2004, outlining the objectives, functions, direction and integration of the state. However, 
the decree does not clearly state roles and missions of any other intelligence organizations. Uribe 
continued reform of the DAS following a series of scandals that will be detailed later in this paper.  
Uribe also reinvigorated the practice begun under President Gaviria incorporating the civilian 
populace into the security process. He instituted regional, district and municipal security councils 
composed of government officials, the business community, academics and other civil society 
actors and has attempted to ensure the information these councils provide feeds into the National 
Security and Defense Council.  
A final point worth mentioning is that one of the most crucial aspects of President Uribe’s 
Democratic and Security Policy focuses on transparency. His administration has held every 
government sector accountable for their activity and one can easily find information in Colombian 
government websites on administration effectiveness, including those of the intelligence 
community.  
Other Oversight Entities  
While the executive branch is the primary purveyor of control in Colombia, some mechanisms of 
oversight exist within the services themselves, from NGOs, the media and independent 
organizations within the Colombian government. The legislative branch plays only a very small 
oversight role.[24]  
Internal Oversight  
As is often the case, intelligence services come under increased scrutiny following scandals or 
intelligence failures; Colombia is no exception. The DAS has suffered from a spate of public 
embarrassments in the past few years. Between February 2003 and June 2005, various parallel 
offices were discovered in Colombia where DAS personnel cached arms and munitions and held 
secret meetings with criminals. In June 2004, a DAS agent met with the chief assassin of one of 
the most notorious drug lords in Colombia and provided information on one of the kingpin’s rivals. 
In September 2004, a senior DAS official was discovered to have erased the records of two top 
drug traffickers with AUC links in order to hamper extradition hearings. Finally, in the fall of 2005, 
a scandal broke linking a secret organization within the DAS to the AUC resulting in the 
resignations of then DAS director Jorge Noguera and his top intelligence official, Enrique Ariza as 
well as the dismissal of José Miguel Narváez, who was the deputy director. And while the scandal 
was pure internal politics, according to Jane’s Intelligence Review, “the DAS remains heavily 
infiltrated…by the AUC.”[25]  
In response, newly appointed DAS chief Andrés Peñate instituted a number of reforms that 
appear to improve internal oversight mechanisms and have largely been made public. Peñate’s 
first act was to undergo a lie detector test and enforce the same provision on all his top officials. 
He has subsequently made the polygraph a recurring requirement. Peñate drew up a ‘risk map’ to 
show the areas of the DAS that were most vulnerable to infiltration. He reassigned the director of 
counterintelligence from a position subordinate to the director of intelligence to Peñate’s personal 
staff. He instituted a promotion system based on merit making all but the three top positions, 
which are presidential appointments, open to competition. Peñate also has begun to introduce 
business practices to return the DAS to its core functions of intelligence and terrorism prevention. 
Finally, he has started a process of integration with other intelligence agencies, already sharing 
more than 170 dossiers for joint investigations.[26] These changes have been well received 
within the DAS and agents are optimistic about Peñate’s leadership.[27] 
Legislative Oversight  
The Comisión Segunda is a committee within the legislature responsible for international policy, 
national defense and public force - functions that would support legislative oversight of 
intelligence;[28] however, the legislature plays only a very small oversight role. Since the fall of 
2006 the legislature has been working on a law designed to protect the identities of intelligence 
operators in the field involved in surveilling Colombian citizens and to formally legalize these 
activities, some of which are forbidden by the Colombian constitution.[29] However, it took 
another scandal for the Colombian congress to offer its first foray into overseeing the intelligence 
services. In late 2003, it was discovered that senior members of the security sector 
misappropriated the Gastos Reservados. In response, legislators passed a law in December 
2003 making the Gastos Reservados account public and providing some scrutiny over 
spending.[30]  
An additional scandal in which these reserve funds were misused surfaced in September 2006 
when officers operating in a Bogotá army HUMINT unit used a demobilized FARC bomb expert to 
plant and defuse bombs in order to gain points toward promotion. From June – August 2006, 
there were seven bombs planted, however, one was not defused, exploded, killed a civilian and 
wounded 19 soldiers. This succession of discoveries, coupled with President Uribe’s August 7 
inauguration, led to the deployment of more than 40,000 troops in Bogotá, some patrolling 
strategic points in tanks. The Army was investigating the matter as of fall 2006.[31] 
NGOs the Media and Other Oversight Entities  
Other independent organizations play a role in overseeing intelligence functions. Colombia’s 
highly respected think tank, Fundación Seguridad y Democracia, routinely analyzes security and 
intelligence policy and in 2004 published a very thorough and thoughtful book, in Spanish, 
Intelligence reform: A democratic imperative, by Andrés Villamizar. Fundación also held public a 
forum in November 2004 with important representation from the public and private sector 
debating key issues of control and transparency in the intelligence community.  
Colombia’s press plays a very active role in overseeing Colombia’s intelligence services. Virtually 
every large-circulation daily and weekly covered the scandals outlined above. Colombia’s press 
also routinely covers intelligence failures, for example the lack of good intelligence that led to the 
return to Colombia from the United States of an extradited alleged FARC member, Nelson Vargas 
Rueda and successes like the capture of FARC finance chief Simón Trinidad, the highest ranking 
FARC member ever captured. The media also routinely prints leaked intelligence documents 
such as the UIAF’s thorough review of FARC finances.[32] This reporting caused such a stir that 
the JIC was forced to respond publicly. This effort by the media clearly led to increased 
transparency.  
Colombia’s constitution specifically provides for a somewhat unique oversight process of the 
intelligence services (and other agencies) through the Contraloría (Comptroller General) an entity 
independent of the executive, legislative or judicial branches. The comptroller’s office conducts 
monthly, quarterly and annual audits of the DAS; however, these audits are focused on the 
overarching hiring processes, expenses and actual numbers of DAS personnel. Representatives 
do not have access to classified information and do not have the expertise to make balanced 
recommendations for improving intelligence.  
NGOs based inside and outside of Colombia also play a prominent role in bringing information 
regarding Colombian military and intelligence to the public domain. These organizations include 
Human Rights Watch, the Washington Office on Latin America, Center for International Policy, 
and Amnesty International, to name just a few. 
Public Inquiries  
Besides the change in leadership at the DAS following the rash of scandals detailed above, 
President Uribe appointed “The Special Commission for the DAS” to analyze the causes of the 
institution’s crises. The commission produced a report that is one of few, if not the only, publicly 
available government sponsored investigations of the intelligence community. Some of the more 
important findings included: a lack of institutional stability; no coherent policy for choosing 
leadership; confusion between personnel matters in general and counterintelligence; and a 
recommendation for “radical reform” of the DAS. The commission was favorably impressed with 
the steps taken by DAS director Peñate to implement greater internal control and to better 
integrate with national security policy.[33]  
The commission also weighed in on greater issues regarding the Colombian intelligence 
community. It called intelligence work duplicative, functionally contradictory and uncoordinated, 
especially regarding operations. The commission noted these problems led to failures in actions 
of great importance to the state. It further called for a high commission to define a national 
intelligence strategy, develop institutional responsibilities, identify priorities and coordinate (not 
centralize) the intelligence activities without losing the autonomy of respective agencies.[34]  
Specific recommendations for changes within the DAS were also presented. They included: the 
divesting of the DAS’s special protection mission but maintaining its role in INTERPOL and 
migration; a focus on recruitment (and minimum skills for entry), training, and personnel 
development plans; an increase in intelligence analysts; and emphasized treating intelligence as 
a profession highlighting four elements: specialized skills, meritocracy, democracy and a new 
culture of intelligence. The report also recommended changing the name of the department to the 
Administrative Department of Intelligence.[35]  
While the commission represented a truly significant step in establishing accountability in the 
intelligence community and was lauded for many of its recommendations, it was roundly criticized 
for turning the investigation of AUC infiltration of the DAS over to the Attorney General’s office, 
thereby relieving the commission of perhaps its most relevant duty. Detractors also lamented the 
report’s findings that DAS’s institutional problems were based on constant personnel shuffles and 
blurred lines of authority rather than any larger structural issue. 
Conclusion  
In reviewing the democratic control regime in Colombia, one can conclude with three key points:  
1. Colombia’s Intelligence Services are under more democratic control, and are at the same 
time more transparent, today than they were at the beginning of the 1990s.  
2. Colombia’s intelligence community has also become more effective over the last two 
decades, though much of this improvement is due to the entire Colombian governmental 
apparatus emphasizing and improving their strategic focus and coordination, primarily 
under the watch of President Álvaro Uribe.  
3. Although the intelligence services are both more transparent and effective than they were 
say 15 years ago, Colombia has sacrificed some transparency in lieu of effectiveness in 
fighting its myriad internal threats, particularly by not implementing any legislative 
oversight mechanisms. This is especially so when comparing Colombia to other 
democracies. Regardless, one has to be impressed with the strides Colombia has made 
in a little more than a decade, especially since this has occurred while the state faces 
threats from internal actors.  
So is there a tradeoff between transparency and effectiveness? Yes, of course. Clearly an 
intelligence community cannot make available to the public sources and methods. When taking 
into account the case of Colombia, as well as other countries that have reformed their intelligence 
communities such as Taiwan, Romania, Argentina, Brazil and even the United States, one might 
conclude that transparency actually improves effectiveness, at least up to a certain point  
While this is true for a whole intelligence enterprise, it would be worthwhile applying this model to 
the each of the intelligence disciplines. Here, we might find how transparency impacts collection, 
analysis, security intelligence and covert operations. To emphasize the point, increased 
transparency, which generally begins with increased democratic control, will lead to improved 
effectiveness.  
Thus, rather than asking if there is a tradeoff between transparency and effectiveness, we should 
be asking:  
• what needs to be transparent (training, professionalism, organization);  
• to whom (executive, legislative, judicial, internal, press); and  
• how much transparency is enough so that the balance between transparency and 
effectiveness is at a peak.  
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